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THE VIRGINIA NATURAL DEATH ACT1 - A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS
Don't treat this patient anymore ... it does not serve either the
patient, the family, or society in any meaningful way to continue
treatment with this patient.2
The right to die with dignity is a controversial issue. In the absence of
legislative guidance, court intervention is often necessary to protect a pa-
tient's right to the privacy of his own body.s At the same time, courts
must protect the state's interests in the preservation of life, the protec-
tion of innocent third parties, the prevention of suicide, and the ethical
integrity of the medical profession. 4
This controversy was brought to the nation's attention in a 1982 case
involving a Down's syndrome newborn. The child's parents decided
against surgery to correct his deformed esophagus. The hospital involved
unsuccessfully petitioned the court for an order to require the lifesaving
operation.5 The Indiana Supreme Court denied review of the trial court
decision, and the baby died before further appeals could be taken." Indi-
ana had no legislation to guide the court in its decision. 7
1. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-325.8:1 to -325.8:13 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
2. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, _ 355 A.2d 647, 657, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976)
(statement of Dr. Julius Korein, a neurologist who testified on behalf of Karen Quinlan).
3. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
4. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, -, 370
N.E.2d 417, 425 (1977). These four factors were listed as legitimate State interests involved
in the withholding of treatment from incompetent persons. The court held that the most
important of these interests was the preservation of human life, but added that this interest
"must be reconciled with the interest of an individual to reject the traumatic cost of that
prolongation." Id. at _, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
5. Indiana ex. rel. Infant Doe v. Monroe Cir. Ct., No. 482-5140 (Ind. Sup. Ct. Apr. 16,
1982).
6. W. WADDINGTON, C. WHITEBREAD & S. DAvis, CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYsTEM, 901 n.1
(1983); Tifft, Debate on the Boundary of Life: Medical Miracles and the Patient's Right to
Die, TIME, Apr. 11, 1983, at 68-69.
7. In addition to Virginia, 13 states and the District of Columbia have natural death or
death with dignity legislation. ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (Cum. Supp. 1982); ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§ 82-3801 to -3804 (Cum. Supp. 1983); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195
(West Cum. Supp. 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 §§ 2501-2509 (Cum. Supp. 1982); D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430 (Cum. Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4508 (Cum.
Supp. 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101 to -28,109 (1982); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 449.540 to
.680 (1979 & Adv. Sheets 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -11 (Repl. Vol. 1981); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -323 (Repl. Vol. 1981); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050-.090 (Repl. Vol.
1981); TEx. l~v. Cxv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1982-83); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 5251 (Cum. Supp. 1983); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010-.122.903 (Cum. Supp.
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In California, two Los Angeles doctors Were charged with murder for
removing the respirator and intravenous food and water sustaining a co-
matose patient.8 In this situation, the doctors had apparently crossed the
line between passive euthanasia, refraining from taking any action to help
or hurt the patient, and active euthanasia, administering a life-shortening
agent." The doctors were later acquited.'° Unlike Indiana, California had
a "Living Will" statute to guide the court."' In general, this type of legis-
lation allows a competent person to declare in advance that he does not
want extraordinary medical treatments to prolong his life should he be-
come terminally ill.1 2 Most of these laws, however, lack similar provisions
for the incompetent patient.
In 1983, the Virginia General Assembly passed the Virginia Natural
Death Act,13 which outlines the procedures to be followed in deciding
whether to withhold or withdraw medical treatment. The most controver-
sial feature of the legislation is also its primary function: to allow the
family and attending physician to make the treatment decision for a pa-
tient who is incompetent or otherwise unable to communicate."'
This comment will first discuss selected landmark cases that provided
the legal setting for the Virginia Natural Death Act. Then, it will address
the issues raised by several individuals and groups before the Joint Sub-
committee Studying the Rights of the Terminally Ill, which was responsi-
ble for researching and developing the Act.' 5
I. JUDICIAL DECISIONS: To TREAT OR NOT TO TREAT
In the absence of any Virginia Supreme Court precedent, the Joint
1983-84).
8. TIME, supra note 6, at 69.
9. Kutner, Euthanasia: Due Process for Death with Dignity; The Living Will, 54 IND. L.
J. 201, 201 (1979).
10. Hedlund v. Superior Ct. of Orange County, L.A. No. 31676 (Sup. Ct. Calif. Sept. 29,
1983).
11. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Cum. Supp. 1983).
12. See, e.g., id. § 7186.
13. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-325.8:1-.8:13 (Cum. Supp. 1983). For a detailed summary of sim-
ilar provisions in the laws of other states, see Freamon, Death with Dignity Laws: A Plea
for Uniform Legislation, 5 SzroN HALL LEGAL J. 105 (1982). This comment will not compare
Virginia's statute to that of other states since many of those statutes are recent and have
not been tested by the courts.
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:6 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
15. See JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE STUDYING THE RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL, REPORT TO
THE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA OF 1983, H.D. Doc. No. 32 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as REPORT]. Subcommittee members were appointed from the House
Committee on Health, Welfare and Institutions (three); the House Committee for Courts of
Justice (two); the Senate Committee on Education and Health (two); the Senate Committee
on Rehabilitation and Social Services (one); and citizens representing the legal and medical
professions and the clergy (five). Id. at 4-5.
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Subcommittee Studying the Rights of the Terminally Ill looked to an Al-
exandria Circuit Court opinion dealing with the right-to-die issue.16 The
patient in this case required respiratory therapy and kidney dialysis. His
prognosis for recovery was poor, and he had indicated his desire to dis-
continue all life-sustaining procedures. The issue before the court was
whether he was capable of making that decision. 17
The court first looked to section 37.1-134.2 of the Code of Virginia18 to
determine the legal competence of the patient. Under this section, a court
may authorize treatment only upon a finding by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the patient is incompetent or incapable of giving his informed
consent to treatment.29 Employing this standard, the court found the pa-
tient legally competent to render decisions regarding his treatment.2"
After making this initial determination, the court concluded that the
patient had the right to refuse treatment, as well as the concomitant right
to discontinue such treatment.1 The case was dismissed after a finding
that the state's interests were "overborne by [the patient's] constitutional
right of privacy and his right to individual free choice and self-determina-
tion. '22 In the absence of legislation, the courts must determine who can
make the decision to forego medical treatment, what the parameters of
those decisions will be, and whether the court must mediate in every case.
These factors have been developed in several landmark cases.2 3
A. In re Quinlan
One of the most publicized cases involving the right to die is In re
Quinlan24 decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1976. Twenty-
16. Alexandria Hosp. v. McLellan, No. 13009 Ch. 1 (Alexandria Cir. Jan. 11, 1982) (Gren-
adier, J.). The Subcommittee cited this opinion as evidence that legislation was necessary in
Virginia. REPORT, supra note 15, at 9. The Subcommittee researched several recent cases on
the use of artificial life support while drafting the Act. See In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420
N.E.2d 64 (1981); Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980); Satz v.
Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, afl'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115
(Mass. 1980). REPORT, supra note 15, at 8. The Subcommittee may not have been aware of
other cases involving similar issues. See, e.g., In re P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 1015 (La. 1982);
Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 434 N.E.2d 601 (1982); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical
Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980).
17. Alexandria Hosp., No. 13009 Ch., slip op. at 1.
18. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.2 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
19. Id.
20. Alexandria Hosp., No. 13009 Ch., slip op. at 1.
21. Id. The court relied upon Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,
373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977), and Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, af'd, 379 So.
2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
22. Alexandria Hosp., No. 13009 Ch., slip op. at 2-3.
23. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Super-
intendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
24. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
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two year old Karen Quinlan was in a permanent vegetative coma; she re-
quired a respirator to breathe.25 Karen's father petitioned the court to
appoint him her guardian with the express power to authorize "the dis-
continuance of all extraordinary medical procedures now allegedly sus-
taining Karen's vital processes and hence her life, since these measures
. . . present no hope of her eventual recovery. '2s
After extensive hearings, the New Jersey Supreme Court appointed
Karen's father as her guardian. 27 Citing Eisenstadt v. Baird,25 Griswold v.
Connecticut,2 9 and Stanley v. Georgia,30 the court recognized that
Karen's right of privacy entitled her to demand or refuse treatment,"1 and
that her father had standing to assert these rights on her behalf.32
Karen's right of privacy was found paramount to the state's interest in
the "preservation and sanctity of human life."33 The court held that "the
State's interest . . weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows
as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims. '' s4
A medical ethics problem arises when doctors must decide whether to
terminate the treatment of a patient who could be kept alive by artificial
means. 35 The Quinlan court labored over this question, e and finally con-
cluded that a hospital-based ethics committee should be consulted before
discontinuing treatment.3 7 If this committee concurs in the physician's
decision to cease treatment, the life-support systems can be removed
without resulting in civil or criminal liability for any participant."
The Quinlan court clarified the extent of its ruling by concluding that
"we do not intend to [imply] that a proceeding for judicial declaratory
relief is necessarily required for the implementation of comparable deci-
sions in the field of medical practice."39 Given the detail in the Quinlan
opinion regarding the procedures to be followed by a third party making
25. Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 653-54.
26. Id. at -' 355 A.2d at 651.
27. Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 671.
28. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
29. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
30. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
31. 70 N.J. 10, - 355 A.2d 647, 663 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), on remand 225 Ga. 273, 167 S.E.2d 756 (1969);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
32. Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 661.
33. Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 663-64.
34. Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 664.
35. Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 656-60.
36. Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 664-69.
37. See Teel, The Physician's Dilemma: A Doctor's View: What the Law Should Be, 27
BAYLOR L. REv. 6, 8-9 (1975) (cited in In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at -, 355 A.2d at 668-69.
38. 70 N.J. at -, 355 A.2d at 671-72. Karen Quinlan is no longer sustained by life
support machines, but is still in a coma. TImE, supra note 6, at 68-69.
39. 70 N.J. at -, 355 A.2d at 672.
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a treatment decision for an incompetent patient, legislation in this area
would arguably be unnecessary in New Jersey.
B. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz
With its landmark decision in Superintendent of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz,40 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has
guided courts throughout the nation in determining how those responsi-
ble for an incompetent patient's care should decide whether to withhold
or withdraw treatment. Saikewicz, a sixty-seven-year-old, mentally in-
competent resident of the Belchertown State School, suffered from leuke-
mia, a disease accompanied by enlarged organs, internal bleeding, weak-
ness, severe anemia, and high susceptibility to infection.41 The issue in
this case was whether to subject Saikewicz to chemotherapy and blood
transfusions. Doctors were concerned about Saikewicz's ability to tolerate
the chemotherapy and its painful side effects. 42
The school superintendent and a staff attorney successfully petitioned
the Hampshire County Probate Court to appoint a guardian ad litem for
Saikewicz. The guardian recommended that no chemotherapy be pursued
because of significant adverse side effects and the patient's inability to
understand what was happening to him. He felt that these factors out-
weighed the potential benefit of the treatment - remission lasting a
maximum of thirteen months.
43
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the state's inter-
ests involved and found them to be either outweighed or cancelled by the
privacy interests of the patient.44 The court further found that both com-
petent and incompetent patients have the right to choose whether to re-
ceive life-prolonging treatment since "the value of human dignity extends
to both.' 45 The court affirmed the probate court's order not to treat
Saikewicz. 46  Saikewicz died two months later without pain or
discomfort.47
Although the Saikewicz decision left the establishment of comprehen-
sive guidelines to the legislature,'8 the court applied the "substituted
judgment doctrine," which holds that
[T]he decision in cases such as this should be that which would be made by
40. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
41. Id. at ., 370 N.E.2d at 420.
42. Id. at . 370 N.E.2d at 420-21.
43. Id. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 419-20.
44. Id. at - 370 N.E.2d at 424-27.
45. Id. at , 370 N.E.2d at 427.
46. Id. at , 370 N.E.2d at 435.
47. Id. at - 370 N.E.2d at 422.
48. Id. at - 370 N.E.2d at 432 n.18.
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the incompetent person, if that person were competent, but taking into ac-
count the present and future incompetency of the individual as one of the
factors which would necessarily enter into the decision-making process of
the competent person.4
Procedural guidelines for implementing this decision-making machinery
already existed in Massachusetts, including the immediate appointment
of a guardian and a guardian ad litem. In addition, the court required the
guardian ad litem to present before the probate judge "after as thorough
an investigation as time will permit, all reasonable arguments in favor of
administering treatment to prolong the life of the individual involved." 50
After hearing this information, the probate judge must then decide
whether to discontinue treatment.51
The Saikewicz decision expressly rejected the recommendation of the
Quinlan court regarding consultation with a hospital ethics committee. 52
The Massachusetts court said it took a "dim view of any attempt to shift
the ultimate decision-making responsibility away from the duly estab-
lished courts of proper jurisdiction to any committee, panel or group
',55
C. In re Dinnerstein
In 1978, another Massachusetts court was confronted with a similar is-
sue in In re Dinnerstein.5 The patient in this case was a sixty-seven-
year-old woman suffering from Alzheimer's disease and related complica-
tions. In 1978 she suffered a stroke which left her completely vegetative,
speechless and immobile. Medicare terminated her benefits because she
required more custodial care than medical treatment.55 The patient's son
and daughter agreed with the attending physician that a "no-code" order
should be entered on the patient's medical record. A "no-code" order en-
sures that in the event of a cardiac or respiratory arrest no extraordinary
measures will be taken to prolong life. The patient's children brought an
action for declaratory judgment seeking judicial authorization for the
"no-code" order.56
The Dinnerstein court discussed the important distinction between or-
49. Id. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 430-31.
50. Id. at , 370 N.E.2d at 433 (emphasis added). This requirement was modified in In
re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, -, 405 N.E.2d 115, 123 (Mass. 1980), where the court stated
that "we impose no duty to present arguments the guardian ad litem does not believe meri-
torious and no obligation to take appeals as a matter of course."
51. 373 Mass. at - , 370 N.E.2d at 434.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978).
55. Id. at -, 380 N.E.2d at 135 n.1.
56. Id. at -, 380 N.E.2d at 136.
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dinary and extraordinary medical techniques. The patient is often or-
dered to submit to ordinary medical treatment when some hope of a cure
or a significant prolongation of life exists. On the other hand, a person is
not required to submit to extraordinary treatment that is not expected to
cure or significantly ameliorate the underlying condition.57 Given the de-
gree of bodily intrusion, extraordinary treatment is considered a positive
violation of the terminally ill individual's right to die with dignity.5 8
Recognizing that it is "obvious on reflection that cardiac or respiratory
arrest will signal the arrival of death for the overwhelming majority of
persons whose lives are terminated by illness or old age,"59 the Dinner-
stein court stated that Saikewicz should not be interpreted as requiring
life-prolonging treatment absent a contrary court order. 0 It distinguished
the earlier case and noted that Saikewicz involved ordinary medical
treatment, while the prohibition of the "no-code" order on Dinnerstein's
record would involve extraordinary treatment. The court noted the cur-
rent medical ethics view that extraordinary means of prolonging life
should not be employed where there is no hope of recovery.6'
The Dinnerstein decision was important because it allowed the attend-
ing physician to make the "no-code" order decision without prior judicial
approval.62 The physician's decision would be subject to court review only
if the doctor "has failed to exercise 'the degree of care and skill of the
average qualified practitioner.' ,,63
D. Custody of a Minor
The "substituted judgment doctrine" applied in Saikewicz was ex-
panded in another Massachusetts case, Custody of a Minor.6 4 This case
involved a newborn child with serious cardiac problems who had been
abandoned at birth. Upon the petition of a social worker, a Boston juve-
nile court granted temporary legal custody of the child to the Department
of Social Services (DSS) and appointed a guardian ad litem.6 5 Doctors
treating the baby asked the DSS and the guardian ad litem to consent to
a "no-code" order; both parties refused. As a result, suit was filed in the
juvenile court, and after a hearing, the judge entered the "no-code" order.
After a series of stays and appeals, the juvenile court's decision was af-
57. Id. at 380 N.E.2d at 137-38.
58. Id. at -, 380 N.E.2d at 139 n.10.
59. Id. at -, 380 N.E.2d at 136.
60. Id. at ., 380 N.E.2d at 137.
61. Id. at ., 380 N.E.2d at 137 (citing Lewis, Machine Medicine and Its Relation to
the Fatally Ill, 206 J. A.M.A. 387 (1968)).
62. 6 Mass. App. Ct. at , 380 N.E.2d at 139.
63. Id. (quoting Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 109, 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (1968)).
64. 385 Mass. 697, 434 N.E.2d 601 (1982).
65. Id. at -, 434 N.E.2d at 602.
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firmed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.6 The court rea-
soned that because of the graveness of the cardiac problems the infant
would, if competent, have chosen to forego extraordinary medical efforts
in the event of cardiac or respiratory arrest.6 7 The court stated that this
was not a right-to-life issue, but rather, as in Dinnerstein, a question of
"the manner of dying and what 'measures are appropriate to ease the
imminent passing of an irreversibly, terminally ill patient in light of the
patient's history and condition.' "68
II. THE VIRGINIA NATURAL DEATH ACT
Against the background of the Quinlan and Saikewicz cases, and the
research and drafting by the Joint Subcommittee Studying the Rights of
the Terminally 111,69 the Virginia Natural Death Act was enacted by a
narrow margin. 0 Since 1976, three similar bills had been introduced but
defeated by the General Assembly.7
1
The objectives of the Act are twofold. First, it codifies the common law
right of a competent adult to refuse extraordinary medical treatment.
This is accomplished by a declaration which states that no extraordinary
medical measures should be used if the declarant is ever afflicted with a
terminal condition. Second, the Act allows certain family members, with
the attending physician's consent, to make the treatment decision for a
patient who is incompetent or otherwise unable to communicate his
wishes.7 12
Three publicized meetings, two public hearings, and a number of writ-
ten comments submitted by interested parties contributed to the devel-
opment of the Act."3 After considering this information, the Subcommit-
tee indicated that its highest priority was protecting the rights of adult
patients incapable of communicating their treatment decisions.7 Al-
though the Subcommittee was aware of the Quinlan and Saikewicz deci-
sions, it thought that more structured guidelines were necessary, espe-
cially in defining the circumstances under which a third party, such as a
66. Id. at -, 434 N.E.2d at 603-05.
67. Id. at -, 434 N.E.2d at 605, 610.
68. Id. at -, 434 N.E.2d at 609 (quoting In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. at
380 N.E.2d at 134).
69. See supra note 15.
70. The bill passed the House of Delegates by a vote of 58 to 37. It then went to the
Senate where it was passed, with amendments, by a 21 to 18 vote. The House agreed to the
Senate amendments by a 59 to 37 vote, and finally the bill was sent to the Governor for
review and approval. 1983 Va. Acts _.
71. See H.B. 872, 1980 Virginia General Assembly; H.B. 1840, 1977 Virginia General As-
sembly; H.B. 620, 1976 Virginia General Assembly.
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:2 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
73. REPORT, supra note 15, at 5.
74. Id. at 10.
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family member, may authorize or refuse treatment for the patient using a
type of "substituted judgment" process. 75
Significantly, the Subcommittee concluded that due to the lack of
guidelines in Virginia, "the patient's family and the health care providers
[are] reluctant to refuse or withdraw life-prolonging medical treatment.
Thus, some terminally ill patients are being treated against their wishes
and, increasingly, the courts are being called upon to make the treatment
decision." 76 The Subcommittee also acknowledged the severe emotional
and financial strain on the surviving family, since a patient's death does
not always occur swiftly.7" Various objections to the passage of the Act
were raised before the Subcommittee, 8 and several issues remain
unanswered.
A. What Is A Terminal Condition.9
The Act defines terminal condition as "a condition caused by injury,
disease or illness from which, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty,
* .* there can be no recovery and ... death is imminent."80 The Sub-
committee admitted its awareness of the problems inherent in this defini-
tion of terminal condition. It considered including a "specific time frame
within which death would result," but later rejected such a determina-
tion.8 The Subcommittee believed that the phrase "death is imminent"
conveyed the intended meaning as precisely as possible.2
Nonetheless, concern was expressed to the Subcommittee that many
terms used in the definition are ambiguous. The meaning of the phrase
"reasonable degree of medical certainty" was questioned.8 3 Another seri-
ous problem with the definition of terminal condition may lie in the
meaning of "imminent," which could mean tomorrow, next week, six
months from now, or next year.8 A critic of the Act urged that "whether
... life support is instituted or withdrawn must be determined by the
imminence and inevitability of death and not by the imminence and
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 11.
78. Id. at 19-20.
79. Id. at 13.
80. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:2 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
81. REPORT, supra note 15, at 14.
82. Id.
83. Letter from Earl R. Johnson, Jr., M.D. to the Joint Subcommittee Studying the
Rights of the Terminally III (Dec. 29, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Johnson].
84. Letter from Lena Harknett, Co-Chairman, Legislative Committee, Virginia Society for
Human Life, to the Joint Subcommittee Studying tlKe Rights of the Terminally III (Feb. 1,
1983) [hereinafter cited as Harknett (Feb. 1, 1983)]; see also Letter from Lena Harknett to
the Subcommittee (Dec. 29, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Harknett (Dec. 29, 1982)].
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probability of death."8 5
The ambiguity in the definition of terminal condition has triggered
fears that the Act practically allows doctors to practice euthanasia. An-
other critic expressed this fear, saying:
A definition of terminal illness that this bill initiates would encourage
broader interpretation by bold sources in the medical community .... For
example, a person with what is thought of as an incurable illness, such as
diabetes, polio, mental retardation, senility, etc., could be regarded as "ter-
minal" in time of accident or crisis, when artificial means would be neces-
sary to prevent his "imminent death" and sustain him until the current
problem is alleviated.88
These definitional problems are significant, and may create serious
problems in the overall operation of the Act.
B. The Role of the Physician and Hospital Committees
One of the Subcommittee's goals was to draft legislation that would
adequately protect physicians and other health care providers from civil
and criminal liability for withdrawing or withholding medical treatment
under the Act.87 The Subcommittee was aware that physicians fear the
legal consequences of "accept[ing] [a] patient for the sole purpose of au-
thorizing the removal of life-prolonging apparatus."88 Thus, a provision
was included in the Act immunizing physicians from civil and criminal
liability for complying with the procedure as set forth.88
Critics were skeptical about the widsom of allowing health care provid-
ers to be completely unanswerable for their conduct.90 They complained
that the Act leaves room for the unscrupulous or careless practice of
medicine, since the physician's degree of legal responsibility toward the
patient is diminished by the absolute immunity provision. 91 One physi-
cian pointed out that requiring a doctor, who refuses to comply with a
declaration authorized by the Act, to make efforts to transfer his patient
to another doctor would be unfair to those doctors "who will fight for the
life of their patients as long as there is any chance of recovery .... 92
85. Johnson, supra note 83.
86. Letter from Geline B. Williams, Chairman of the Board of Directors, National Right
to Life Committee, to the Joint Subcommittee Studying the Rights of the Terminally Ill
(Feb. 1, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Right to Life].
87. REPORT, supra note 15, at 12.
88. Id. at 11.
89. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:8. (Cum. Supp. 1983).
90. Telephone interview with Geline B. Williams, Chairman of the Board of Directors,
National Right to Life Committee (Apr. 11, 1983).
91. Id. See Johnson, supra note 83.
92. Johnson, supra note 83.
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Such action is required by the Act.9 3 Another commentator argued that
"[i]nevitably, some patients will die who might have recovered."'"
A Medical College of Virginia professor recommended the use of an
ethics committee very similar to the one in Quinlan.9 5 He pointed out
that the decision to withhold or withdraw treatment takes place most
often in a hospital's Intensive Care Unit (ICU),96 and cautioned that doc-
tors, especially those in teaching hospitals, "are frequently unaware of the
patient other than as a challenge to the efficiency of the life support sys-
tems."' 7 According to the professor, these factors, coupled with the trend
toward Health Maintenance Organizations and less personalized medical
care in general, mean that the "assumption that humanistic or legalistic
interactions will take place is totally false unless [the Act creates] a for-
malized structure that makes dialogue between those responsible for life
withdrawal possible." 9 His proposed solution to this potentially deper-
sonalizing and dehumanizing situation was to create an ICU "Life Sup-
port Committee" to ensure informed consent for life support with-
drawal.9 9 This informational committee would meet regularly with the
patient's family to advise them of the patient's condition.10 0 Part of this
proposed procedure includes written notification to the family that the
patient has been diagnosed as terminally ill.1°l
Other commentators endorsed a hospital committee structure, prima-
rily for the purpose of having more than one physician's decision concern-
ing a patient who has not made a prior declaration.10 2 The committee
would consist of two specialists in the appropriate area of medicine.10 3
Legal and religious advice would also be provided to the next of kin, who
would make the ultimate decision.' In principle, this type of committee
effectuates what the Act proposes: that in order for an incompetent per-
son without a declaration to become "qualified," one other physician
must concur with the attending physician that the patient is "afflicted
93. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:7 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
94. Harknett (Dec. 29, 1983), supra note 84.
95. Letter from William Regelson, M.D., Professor of Medicine at the Medical College of
Virginia, to the Joint Subcommittee Studying the Rights of the Terminally IMI (Dec. 28,
1982) [hereinafter cited as Regelson]. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
96. Regelson, supra note 95.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. Dr. Regelson proposed a committee composed of a hospital administrator, the at-
tending physician, the ICU physician, an ICU nurse, and a lay representative, such as a
chaplain or trustee. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Harlmett (Feb. 1, 1983), supra note 84.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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with a terminal condition.' 0
5
The Act neither precludes nor requires these committees. Hence, the
decision-making process remains strictly a private matter between the pa-
tient, the family, and the attending physicians.
C. Is the Act Necessary?
Some commentators believed the Act was an unnecessary codification
of current practices and procedures.10 s They argued that the Act does not
add to the rights of incompetent patients because families have always
had the right to consult another physician. 07 Critics also suggested that
the Act authorized needless state intrusion into a private decision-making
process. 08 They believed medical decisions about incompetent patients
should be left to the immediate family following consultations with doc-
tors and ministers.100
Despite these opinions, the Subcommittee determined that legislation
was necessary to ensure the right of competent patients to refuse treat-
ment and to resolve the uncertainty surrounding treatment of incompe-
tent patients."10
D. Making and Revoking the Declaration
The Act's major drawback may be its lack of adequate assurance for
informed consent. This problem is inherent in a system of giving in-
105. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:2 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
106. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 83. Dr. Johnson stated:
Physicians are already withholding or withdrawing life support from patients when
fully convinced that death is both imminent and inevitable. In my 28 years of clinical
experience I have never seen a patient with terminal cancer put on a respirator, nor
have I ever seen a patient with a demonstrably dead brain maintained on a respirator
longer than was required to make that determination and to obtain the consent of the
patient's family to discontinue it. . .. Furthermore, patients with fatal diseases...
whose death is imminent and inevitable almost always have a "no-code" order on
their charts.
Id. See also Right to Life, supra note 86.
107. Johnson, supra note 83.
108. Right to Life, supra note 86.
109. Letter from Kathleen E. Scheg, Associate Director, Office of Justice and Peace for
the Catholic Diocese of Richmond, Virginia, representing Bishop Walter F. Sullivan, to the
Joint Subcommittee Studying the Rights of the Terminally IM1 (Feb. 1, 1983) (Petitions en-
couraging the General Assembly to enact legislation allowing a competent person to refuse
medical treatment were attached to the letter.).
Since the Catholic Church's primary concerns - patient's rights and absolute prohibition
of euthanasia - are addressed by the Act, the Church found it consistent with Catholic
beliefs and teachings. Id. See also In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, -, 355 A.2d 647, 658 (1976)
(quoting an address by Pope Pius XII to anesthesiologists on Nov. 24, 1957).
110. REPORT, supra note 15, at 11.
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formed consent today for action to be taken under unknown circum-
stances in the future.111 While a healthy person may freely consent to
execute a declaration when he is well, his wishes may change when death
is imminent.'12
The Subcommittee addressed this potential problem, but only in the
area of oral declarations." 3 In order to minimize the potential for falsifi-
cation of an oral declaration, the Act requires that the declaration be
made in the presence of a physician and two witnesses." 4 In addition, the
oral declaration must be made subsequent to the diagnosis of a terminal
condition." 5 The Subcommittee believed this would guarantee the "op-
portunity for a well-informed decision, " 16 since the decision would be
made when the full extent of the illness is known.
The Act, however, fails to address adequately the competency or in-
competency of the patient at the time of the declaration. The Act has
been criticized for its "pervasive problems of competency and incompe-
tency."'11 7 For example, the testimony of witnesses is the only means of
determining a person's competency at the time a declaration is made;
however, witnesses under the Act can be anyone "who is not a spouse or
blood relative of the patient.""'x 8 This implies that a minor, or a person
with a financial interest in the declarant's death, could act as a witness.
More stringent limitations were recommended." 9
The Act also fails to provide a procedure for proving incompetency
before the "substituted-decision" process is triggered. Under Virginia law,
a patient's incompetence must be shown by clear and convincing evidence
before a court can order a physician to administer life-saving treat-
ment. 20 The Act, however, allows physicians and families to withhold
life-saving treatment without any neutral adjudication of the patient's in-
competence.' 2' This also applies when the patient has made a previous
declaration and later becomes incompetent. Critics have stressed the need
for an impartial body, such as a court or hospital committee, to determine
whether the patient is "irreversibly"'' 22 incompetent within the meaning
111. Harknett (Feb. 1, 1984), supra note 84; Harknett (Dec. 29, 1982), supra note 84.
112. Johnson, supra note 83.
113. REPORT, supra note 15.
114. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:3 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
115. Id.
116. REPORT, supra note 15, at 13.
117. Testimony of Willis J. Spaulding, Director, Mental Health Law Training and Re-
search Center, University of Virginia, to the Senate Committee on Education and Health
(Feb. 17, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Spaulding].
118. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:2 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
119. Spaulding, supra note 117, at 3.
120. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.2 (Cum. Supp. 198 ).
121. Spaulding, supra note 117, at 3.
122. Id. at 6-7.
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of the Act. Even with the safeguard of an impartial decision-maker, an
incompetent patient with a declaration on record may still be vulnera-
ble123 where he wants to revoke a prior declaration, but is unable to com-
municate this desire.22 4
Furthermore, a discrepancy exists between the language of the Act and
the text of the suggested declaration form regarding the degree of cer-
tainty required for a diagnosis of "terminal condition.' 25 The Act re-
quires a terminal condition to be diagnosed to a "reasonable degree of
medical certainty," 2 6 while the declaration contains no such standard.127
Taken as a whole, these factors point out the Act's shortcomings regard-
ing informed consent from both competency and substantive information
standpoints.
E. Substituted Consent to Withdrawal of Treatment
In the absence of a declaration, family members must decide whether
to terminate treatment for an incompetent patient. The Subcommittee
recommended adoption of guidelines to aid family members in making
this decision. 28 Accordingly, the Act outlines procedures to be followed,
beginning with consultation and agreement between the attending physi-
cian and an individual family member specified in the Act.129 To safe-
guard against fraud, the Act requires "at least two witnesses present at
the time of the consultation when the treatment decision is made
.... M0so Further, at least two of the persons allowed by the statute to
make a "substituted judgment" must consent whenever possible."'3 The
Subcommittee "contemplated that by mandating consultation and the
priority of decision-makers, and providing for disinterested witnesses the
decision will be made in the best interests of the patient." 2
Unfortunately, many of the concerns expressed over competency and
123. Harknett (Dec. 29, 1982), supra note 84.
124. A declaration may be revoked orally or by physical destruction of the written docu-
ment. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:5 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
125. Johnson, supra note 83. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:4 for a suggested form of
written declaration.
126. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:2 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
127. Id. at § 54-325.8:4.
128. REPORT, supra note 15, at 17. Other states allow third parties to make treatment
decisions on behalf of an incompetent patient. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3803 (Supp. 1983);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 2502 (Cum. Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (Repl. Vol.
1981).
129. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:6 (Cum. Supp. 1983) (judicially appointed guardian or
committee, persons designated by the patient in writing, patient's spouse, patient's adult
child, patient's parents, patient's nearest living relative).
130. Id. See REPORT, supra note 15, at 13.
131. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:6 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
132. REPORT, supra note 15, at 18.
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informed consent also apply to the "substituted judgment" procedures in
the Act. The next of kin making the decision could have a financial inter-
est by way of inheritance rights. 3 ' Additionally, the Act makes family
members immune from civil and criminal liability for their actions. 134
This appears to leave the burden of detecting any bad faith upon the
physician. Yet there is nothing the physician can do about it, given his
obligation under the Act to transfer a patient to another doctor if he ref-
uses to comply with the family's request."35 Moreover, some have argued
that the Act does not "advance the patient's 'fundamental right to con-
trol decisions' by summarily assigning that right to someone else." 13
F. The Pregnant or Minor Patient
An interesting aspect of the Act involves its treatment of pregnant and
minor patients. In light of the trimester rules of Roe v. Wade,"37 the legis-
lature's failure to limit application of the Act to women in their first tri-
mester of pregnancy leaves the Act open to potential invalidation on con-
stitutional grounds."s8
The existing legal rights of minors are preserved, but not expanded
under the Act."39 Some legislative protection already exists for minors in
situations similar to those contemplated by the Act. Federal legislation
indirectly protects all handicapped persons, including minors, from dis-
crimination based on a handicap.' 0 Louisiana is presently the only state
133. Spaulding, supra note 117, at 3.
134. Id. at 4. See also VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:8 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
135. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:7 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
136. Spaulding, supra note 117, at 4 (quoting H.B. 329, 1983 Va. Gen. Assem., codified at
VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:1 (Cum. Supp. 1983)).
137. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
138. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:2 (Cum. Supp. 1983) (defining "qualified patient"
without special provision for pregnant patients).
Other statutes disqualify a pregnant woman during the term of her pregnancy. ALA. CODE
§ 22-8A-4(a) (Cum. Supp. 1982); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Cum. Supp.
1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 2503(d) (Cum. Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,103
(1982); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.610 (1979 & Adv. Sheets 1983); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
4590(h) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1982-83); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030 (Cum. Supp.
1983-84).
139. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:12 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
140. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976
& Supp. 1982)). The government is currently attempting to promulgate even more stringent
laws to protect infants from deliberate starvation. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of
Handicap, 48 Fed. Reg. 9630 (1983) (interim final rule) (invalidated by court order and
suspended pending appeal, 48 Fed. Reg. 17.588 (1982)). For a discussion of the legal
problems concerning "defective" infants, see W. WADDINGTON, C. WHrrFBREAD & S. DAviS,
CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 901 n.1 (1983). Tvo states include specific provisions for
minors in natural death legislation. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3804 (Cum. Supp. 1983); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 24-7-4 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
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with a law forbidding the deprivation of food, water, oxygen, or medical
care necessary to preserve the life of an infant,141 even where the quality
of life will be diminished if the child lives.142 That statute contains an
exception, however, which is triggered when the child is in a profound
comatose condition.14s The constitutionality of this exception has been
upheld in the Louisiana Supreme Court.14
The Subcommittee felt that the right to make a declaration should be
reserved for competent adults145 "due to the much stronger interests of
the parents or guardians and the state in [the minor's] treatment deci-
sions.' '14" The complexity of these issues, as well as time limitations, 147 led
the Subcommittee to recommend further study of treatment decisions for
terminally ill minors.148 The Subcommittee also recognized that "judicial
determination of [these issues] might be appropriate .... 4
III. CONCLUSION
At first impression, the Virginia Natural Death Act merely appears to
codify rights and procedures in existence at common law or in common
practice by physicians. The Act is useful because it sets forth procedures
for physicians and families to follow. However, ethical issues arise for vir-
tually all persons complying with the Act. Physicians now must face the
task of judging when to save lives, as well as how to comply with the
statute. Additionally, they may be discouraged from pursuing vigorous
treatment of a patient due to fear of liability for failure to comply with
the Act.
Another concern raised by the Act is that patients may feel compelled
to sign a declaration because of the escalating cost of medical care in light
of the financial burden extended care creates. In addition, the Act may
induce feelings of worthlessness in elderly persons.
There is throughout the proposed act ... the implied notion that a termi-
nally ill person who does want extraordinary means used is engaged in a
somewhat demeaning action that causes loss of dignity and gives him only a
141. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.36.1(A) (West Cum. Supp. 1983).
142. Id. § 40:1299.36.1(B).
143. Id. § 40:1299.36.1(C).
144. In re P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 1015 (La. 1982) ("No-code" order on brain-damaged in-
fant). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court accomplished the same result without a
statute. See Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 434 N.E.2d 601 (1982). See also Application
of Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (child "defective" but not
brain dead).
145. REPORT, supra note 15, at 16.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 17.
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precarious and burdensome existence. The act can be read by the elderly
and/or seriously ill as a subtle document of self-rejection. The elderly are
encouraged to fashion an image of themselves as not being useful or as be-
ing a burden on the rest of society. .... .50
Finally, the philosophical and moral implications of such legislation are
significant. Critics fear that the Act brings the State one step closer to
condoning euthanasia.
Whether the Act is necessary, or whether it adds to the existing rights
of competent and incompetent patients is debatable. It was probably
more appropriate for the legislature to speak on the subject than for the
Virginia courts to be forced to judicially legislate in this area. By making
the termination procedure easy for the surviving family, the Act may
have neglected to protect the vulnerable patient. The balance between
preserving a patient's privacy and providing safeguards to prevent abuse
is delicate. The Act, as it now stands, preserves privacy at the expense of
adequate safeguards. Many issues remain to be addressed before the Vir-
ginia Natural Death Act will truly ensure death with dignity.
Janice G. Murphy*
150. Harknett (Dec. 29, 1982), supra note 84 (emphasis added).
* The author thanks Mary Kathleen Martin, who gathered information from the Legisla-
tive Services Division of the Commonwealth of Virginia.
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